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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRENT JACKSON, RAQUEL NIELSEN, 
AND PATRICIA E. SMITH, : 
Defendants/Appellants. : 
: Case No. 950696-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CITIZENS HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
OF PRIVACY IN RESIDENTIAL TRASH WHICH IS PROTECTED 
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND WHICH CANNOT BE CURED BY APPLICATION OF 
A "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION 
The State asserts that the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), wherein 
it was decided that citizens have no expectation of privacy in 
trash left outside a home's curtilage under the Fourth Amendment, 
should apply to the case at hand because a different result is 
not warranted under the search and seizure provision of Utah's 
constitution. The State argues that a departure from Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence under the state constitution should be 
made only in cases where federal analysis is plagued with 
inconsistencies and/or confusion (Br. of Appellee at 12-13). 
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However, the State also acknowledges that such criteria "do nor 
fully determine the court's discretion to depart from federal 
standards" (Br. of Appellee at 12). Defendants assert that an 
independent interpretation of Article I, Section 14 is warranted 
just as it was proper in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1991) . 
The issue in Thompson was whether individuals had a 
recognizable state constitutional interest in their bank records. 
Like the issue at hand, the United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), had previously held that a 
depositor had no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank 
records under the United States Constitution. The Thompson court 
held that the privacy of bank records was protected by Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 810 P.2d at 418. The court 
premised its decision in part upon a finding that independent 
state constitutional analysis was warranted because the Miller 
rule created confusion and was in conflict with the generalized 
expectation of privacy test set forth in Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court's 
holdings in California v. Greenwood and Katz v. United States 
create the same confusion and tension and independent state 
analysis is likewise warranted. 
The State argues further that the framer's of Utah's 
constitution did not intend to give Article I, Section 14 of the 
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state constitution a oirterent scope than the Fourth Amer ldn lei 1 t i :..( • 
the united States Con-r itmion because, ultimately, J anguage 
111,; c i 1. _i_ _y J... vJ. v_j i i L... _t_ \-.. oi i « i i< u O /\ i < >' f t l ie I* 01 i„:i : LI: 1 i * n t .e i ldn tei 1 t was adopted 
b;y the state (Br. of Appellee at 16). I lowever, the State also 
n o t e s c o r r e c t J y 11: i, a t „:i t w a s o i I ] ;\, : i I 11: i. E • r • s p e a t e d r e v j s :i c • i I : f t h e 
proposed Utah Constitution--and Artic1e I, Section 1 4 in 
particular--deemed necessary to the grant of statehood, that the 
text of the final draft of Artie] e I, Section 14 came to be 
nearlv identical *o tla: or 1 h^ F'^urtn Amendm^r1 * ih'^ nisiory 
v ' i .::^;: ?.d severely, 
and driven from the privacy . r their homes ar,o eommui it ies, :: 
iifty years after settlement were marked witt continual tnreats 
J J N - : ^ - t - - ' ; . • • • * • i-
1 orig-;jdtt±e was waged before Utah was grantee statenooa. '^ee 
Society of Separation:sts v. '/Jr. i t ohead , b 70 r.zd ^ D iUtan ly^o;. 
Utah's constitution . . lkewu-c urijgiu because Utah's people, 
born - -r of necessity and experience, have always been weary ui 
i *-: - . ..i^irs and vigilant in 
the protection o: i nd Vjdiidl liberties. Therefore. • ndependent 
ol thib state's searci ana seizure provisic^i .s likewise 
necessary. 
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In addition, the State argues that a different result under 
the Utah's constitution is not justified because "the handful of 
cases which have found an expectation of privacy in trash have 
either based their decisions on the unique language of their 
state constitutions, are supported by poor reasoning, or have 
been rejected by their own superior court" (Br. of Appellee at 
28) . 
While it is true that Hawaii and Washington have state 
constitutional provisions which textually address "privacy" or 
"private affairs", the courts in both states based their 
decisions of a legitimate expectation of privacy in trash, not 
only upon the state's constitutional provision but upon an 
analysis of whether society was prepared to recognize that an 
expectation of privacy relating to trash was reasonable. See 
State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Hawaii 1985), and State v. 
Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Washington 1990). 
Moreover, Defendants are confident that the State would find 
all decisions from other jurisdictions which have adopted a 
different analysis—or have advocated a different result — than 
that proposed by the State, to be "supported by poor reasoning." 
Such a position is inherent to advocacy in an adversarial system. 
In this case, Defendants had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in their trash left on the curtilage for collection and 
such an expectation is legitimate and reasonable. Provo City 
4 
ordinance mandates the time and place of trash collection. In 
addition, the city also mandates the use and rental of a 
particular trash container. Defendants did not abandon their 
trash, nor was it left on the street in a manner which invites 
public scrutiny. The trash was left in a closed-container 
mandated by the city and was left for collection pursuant to the 
requirements of the city. Therefore, defendants expectation of 
privacy was reasonable and should be recognized as such by this 
Court under the Utah Constitution. See, Boland, 800 P.2d at 1114 
(reliance on similar city ordinances). See also, State v. 
Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996); and State v. Hempele. 576 A.2d 
793 (N.J. 1990).x 
Finally, the State asserts the position taken by the trial 
court in the denial of defendants motion to suppress: Even if a 
state constitutional issue exists, the validity of the search is 
upheld on the basis of "good faith"—or the reasonableness of the 
officers' belief that a trash search is constitutional based upon 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in California v. 
Greenwood (Br. of Appellee at 28-32) . 
lCf. People v. Hillman. 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992). In 
Hillman, the Colorado Supreme Court found no state constitutional 
recognition of a legitimate expectation of privacy in trash left in 
plastic bags on the side-walk for collection. However, the 
Colorado court also recognized that "there may be circumstances in 
which a resident may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
garbage bags that are so positioned within the curtilage of a 
residence as to not be readily accessible to the public." 834 P. 2d 
at 1277. 
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The State argues that defendants have not articulated a 
basis for this Court to reject application of a good faith 
exception under the Utah Constitution nor have defendants given 
this Court adequate legal analysis to reach the merits of the 
issue on appeal (Br. of Appellee at 30-31). However, this 
argument ignores that the question of a "good faith" exception 
under the Utah Constitution was raised by the trial court and 
debated by the parties; and furthermore Utah courts have yet to 
address the issue. 
Moreover, the good faith exception as articulated in United 
State? v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and extended in Illinois v, 
Krullr 480 U.S. 340 (1987), was created for cases whether the 
police have relied upon an incorrect determination of probable 
cause by a magistrate in the issuance of a warrant or upon an 
unconstitutional statutory scheme which authorizes such a 
warrantless search. State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 
1991). This distinction from the case at hand is explicitly 
recognized by the State on appeal (Br. of Appellee at 31). In 
this case, there was no reliance by the officers upon either a 
decision by a magistrate or upon the regulatory actions of the 
state legislature. At issue in this case is not the detrimental 
reliance relating to the officers' conduct but the very 
constitutionality of the conduct itself. 
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However, the State asserts that a "good faith" exception is 
applicable here because the "officers fully comported with all 
existing legal regulations at the time of the search, and 
therefore, their reliance on that precedent was necessarily in 
good faith" (Br. of Appellee at 31). The only existing 
"regulation" concerning the constitutionality of trash can 
searches in Utah is the California v. Greenwood decision by the 
United States Supreme Court that such a search does not violate 
the United States Constitution. There is no precedent which the 
officers could have relied upon under the Utah Constitution. In 
addition, the Greenwood court explicitly recognized that 
"individual states may surely construe their own constitutions as 
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does 
the Federal Constitution." 486 U.S. at 43. This clearly placed 
the officers on notice that such a search may not be 
constitutional under the Utah Constitution, and that such a 
determination could be made only by Utah courts. So, while the 
officers' reliance upon Greenwood may have been reasonable and in 
good faith in federal court or under federal analysis, it is not 
reasonable—and definitely not in good faith--under the Utah 
Constitution. 
Furthermore, should this Court find that a "good faith" 
exception is applicable under Article I, Section 14, "judicial 
integrity" would require this Court to "extend the benefit" of 
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its decision finding trash can searches unconstitutional in Utah 
because "it would be unconscionable to deprive [defendants], who 
[have] sustained the burden of attacking an unconstitutional 
[search], of the fruits of victory, thereby discouraging" such 
constitutional challenges. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 
854-55 (Utah 1994)(citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court find the 
search of their trash to be violative of Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution; and that as such, all evidence or 
information gained therefrom must be excluded and the trial 
court's denial of defendant's suppression motion reversed. In 
addition, as argued in Appellants' opening brief, with or without 
the information gained from the unconstitutional trash search, 
the affidavit in probable cause was insufficient to support the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause. Moreover, Utah does not 
recognize a "good faith" exception under Article I, Section 14; 
and were this Court to find such an exception, it would be 
"unconscionable" to deprive defendants of the "fruits of 
victory." 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^jT day of January, 1997. 
Thomas H. Means 
Counsel for Appellants 
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